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Abstract: One of the inherent properties of biometrics is the ability to use unique  features for identification and 
verification of users. The usable biometric features in humans are limited in number and they must be kept 
secret; if a biometric factor is compromised it presents a challenge that may defy solution. In this paper we 
present a novel method to preserve privacy of users’ biometrics. Using an elastic matching algorithm, we 
produce  a  digest  that  can  be  substituted  for  the  raw biometric  factor.  This  will  ensure  that  the  users’ 
biometric data is never exposed during the authentication phase. 
1 INTRODUCTION
Identification  and  authentication  are  security 
requirements  that  have  steadily  become  more 
important  in  private  and  public  sectors. 
Governments,  military,  financial  communities, 
medical  industries,  etc.  continually  seek  effective 
methods  to  identify  and  authenticate  their  users. 
Traditionally,  username-passwords  have  been 
employed  in  almost  all  access-control  systems; 
however  this  method  has  proved  unsatisfactory
especially when users insist on very short and easy 
passwords  to  memorise  (Argles et  al,  2007).  The 
difficulty of remembering passwords arises from the 
amount  of  entropy  in  the  passwords.  By  allowing 
passwords with less entropy, we are creating weak 
passwords that  would be easier  for the attacker to 
guess. The  migration  from  single-authentication  to 
dual-factor  authentication  which  provides  stronger 
and effective security schemes is well documented 
(Jain  et  al,  2000;  Bolle  et  al,  2004).  Biometric 
technology is a potential approach to authentication 
which  will  create more  secure  systems  since 
biometric data is unchangeable and not forgettable. 
A biometric authentication system generally consists 
of two stages (see figure 1). During the enrolment 
phase  a  users’  biometric  image  is  acquired,  a 
biometric template is created and the templates are
stored in a database or on a portable storage device 
like  a  smartcard  (Davida  et  al,  1998).  During  the 
authentication  phase, the  user  presents a biometric 
sample which is compared with the stored template. 
The user is successfully authenticated if there is a 
near  match  between  the  input  and  the  stored 
template. In this paper biometric raw data refers to 
the  unmodified  image  of  a  fingerprint  which  is 
extracted  and  stored  on  the  biometric  server.  The 
template  data  refers  to  the  stored  features  which 
were  extracted  from  the  fingerprint  image;  they 
contain  information  necessary  for  comparison. 
Ironically one of the greatest benefits of biometric 
factors  also  poses  a  challenge  i.e.,  they  are 
unchangeable  and  easily  forgeable. According  to 
Ratha  et  al,  (2007)  “if  a  biometric  identifier  is 
compromised it is lost forever and possibly for every 
application  where  the  biometric  is  used”.  This  is 
particularly significant as once a biometric factor is 
exposed it loses its value as a factor and a user may 
not  immediately  be  aware  that  their  biometric  has 
been compromised. A common concern in biometric 
security is the privacy issues  derived from storage 
and misuses of the template data (Jain et al, 2007).Figure 1: Biometric Architecture (Jain & Panakanti, 2000)
2 RELATED WORK
One  potential  means  of  safe-guarding  stored 
templates is encryption. In a review article, Jain et 
al, (2007) suggest that multiple acquisitions of the 
same biometric trait will not yield the same feature 
set  and  as  a  result  biometric  templates  cannot  be 
stored  in  an  encrypted  form.  Furthermore,  the 
biometric  templates  would  need  to  be  decrypted 
prior to matching; therefore they will be inevitably
exposed to potential hacker attacks (Braithwaite et 
al, 2002). Ratha et al, (2001) proposed the concept 
of cancellable transforms to overcome the problems 
of compromised biometric templates. The technique 
introduced unique distortions of raw biometric data 
such that instead of storing the original biometric it 
is  transformed  using  a  one-way  function;  the 
transformed biometric and transformation are stored. 
In their proposal they conclude that transforms are 
noninvertible therefore it is computationally hard to
recover  the  original  biometric  identifier  from  a 
transformed  version  thus  preserving  privacy. 
Braithwaite et al, (2002) argues that it is necessary 
in some cases to reverse the transformation prior to 
matching  which  would  expose  the  raw  biometric 
data  and  make  it  susceptible  to  hacking.  To 
eliminate the need to revert the templates to a non-
transformed  state  during  the  authentication, 
Braithwaite  et  al,  (2002)  propose  the  use  of 
application-specific  biometric  templates.  In  this 
approach  the  biometric  template  assumes  a  new 
format  that  is  unique  for  each  application  and  the 
transformations are  such  that  the  matching can  be 
performed on the transformed templates. Argles et 
al,  (2007)  consider  a  similar  problem  of  ensuring 
privacy of the users’ biometric even if the biometric 
database server is compromised. They suggest a split 
and  merge  technique  which  is  a  hybrid  scheme 
incorporating  an  electronic  token  and  biometric 
verification. In this method the encrypted biometric 
template and user key is split during storage.  One 
half  of  the  encrypted  template  is  stored  on  an 
electronic media and the other is retained inside the 
secure  biometric  database.  Storing  the  encrypted 
data in two separate locations makes it difficult for 
an intruder to compromise the system. Without the 
decryption key the attacker will first be required to 
break  the  encryption  algorithm.  Once  the  key 
generator  is  exposed  the  information  leakage 
becomes  problematic,  reducing  the  difficulty  of 
guessing the template by half. 
 Other  approaches  which  address  the  issue  of 
ensuring privacy of biometric templates include the 
use of steganography (Jain & Uludag, 2003) and the 
secure sketch scheme (Sutcu et al, 2007). 
3 ANALYSIS OF SPLIT AND 
MERGE TECHNIQUE
The split and merge technique attempts to ensure 
privacy of the biometric factor by splitting the factor 
into multiple components (Argles et al, 2007). The 
system  uses  a  biometric  (fingerprint)  and  physical 
(USB  drive)  factor;  where  the  removable  storage 
device is used to secure a user-selectable password 
(user key). In figure 2 and figure 3 the enrolment 
and matching processes of the method is shown. To 
analyse the split and merge system we shall assume 
that  key  generation,  splitting,  merging,  encryption 
and  decryption  functions  have  the  following 
properties:
Assumption 1: The key generation function is a 
good pseudorandom function with a large period -
without  knowing  the  seed,  we  cannot  deduce  the 
next outcome of the generator irrespective of how 
many previous outcomes we have collected
Assumption  2:  The  splitting  function 
) , ( : B b A a x S     splits an input x into two 
components  containing  equal  amounts  of 
information:     b i a i B A   
Assumption  3:  The  encryption  function  is 
Shannon  secure  (Shannon,  1951)  and  leaks  no 
information.  For  a  cryptosystem: 
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These  simplifications  are  made  so  we  can 
analyse the system independently of any weaknesses 
that  maybe  inherited  from  these  functions  in 
implementation.}) , { , ( u t k E
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Figure 2: Enrolment using the split and merge method
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Figure 3: Authentication using the split and merge method
3.1 Security Dependant on Obscurity
 In addressing the shortcomings in the design of 
the split and merge technique,  we shall consider a 
scenario where an attacker has acquired the portable 
storage device and attempts to recover the user key 
from the authentication system. (The key generation 
function must be deterministic; else the system will 
be unable to recover the key). We shall assume the 
attacker  has  access  to  the  key  generator  and  the 
biometric database. Thus, from figure 3 we make the 
following observations:
 It is possible to partition the system to only 
require  p c and  d c to recover the biometrics.
 The attacker can derive the biometrics of the 
user  by  acquiring  the  storage  device  and  having 
access to the authentication system; it is possible to 
recover the fingerprint template of the user.
For an authentication session consisting 
of  d p c c k i , , ,  (see figure 3), we define the 
following operations:
Merge as M:   c c c d p  ,
Decrypt as D:     u t c k , , 
Compares as C:     false true t i , ,  (3.1.1)
Then figure 3 is summarised as:
      d p c c M k D u t , , ,  (3.1.2)
Since the splitting and  merging functions must 
be  bijective,  they  must  also  be  deterministic; 
extracting  t  or  u   from    u t,   should  always  be 
possible. Deriving  u t, in 3.1.2 does not employ the 
capabilities  of  the  compare  function,  thus  the 
biometric factor is not used. Exposing the biometric 
template  of  the  user  is  a  bigger  problem  than 
exposing a single biometric input of a single scan. 
The template is often a better true representation of 
the  biometric  feature  than  an  average  scan  by 
definition. It is important for the security of the spilt 
and merge system to keep the key generator private.
3.2 Exposed Biometrics
During authentication the user’s biometric data 
is briefly exposed to allow the matching of the input 
biometric  and  the  template.  The  matching  phase 
cannot be performed on the client as it requires both 
the input biometric and the template, thus it needs to 
be  performed  on  the  server.  As  an  example,  a 
disgruntled employee with access to the server could 
recover  the  complete  biometric  template  by 
compromising  the  privacy  of  the  matching 
component.  This  action  defeats  the  purpose  to 
protect  the  user  biometrics  in  the  event  that  the 
server is compromised.
4 PROPERTIES OF BIOMETRICS
Existing fingerprint algorithms do not attempt to 
directly extract a unique invariant representation of 
the fingerprints (Jain et al, 2000). In practice these
would  require  perfect  equipment  and  conditions; instead  they  use  an  approximation  of  the  unique 
invariant  representation  (template  biometric).  The 
biometric  factor  is  then  compared  to  the  template 
which can be either accepted or rejected depending 
on  the  amount  of  work  required  to  transform  one 
into the other. The transformations may be complex
(Ma et al, 2004) and the end comparison is the result 
of a number of probabilistic and heuristic operations. 
Due to this, the matching will always have a non-
zero probability of false acceptances and rejections. 
Common biometrics such as fingerprints provide a 
high  degree  of  reliability  when  identifying  a  user; 
however  they  can  also  be  forged  with  varying 
degrees  of  success.  For  this  reason,  fingerprints 
alone are  insufficient  for authentication.  Biometric 
factors are more suited as identification factors due 
to being forgeable and immutable. Thus, the use of 
biometrics as an authentication factor relies on the 
ability to keep the biometrics secret. Exposing the 
users’ biometrics may have severe consequences; a 
user  will  have  only  one  set  of  fingerprints  as
opposed to having different passwords for access.
We  shall  define  failure  of  an  authentication 
system by:
 Positive  failure:  occurs  when  the  system 
incorrectly supports an identity
 Negative  failure:  occurs  when  the  system 
fails to support a correct identity
5 COMPONENTS OF THE NEW 
SYSTEM
The  proposed  system  aims  to  achieve  strong 
authentication  by  the  use  of  a  physical  and  a 
biometric  factor.  We  assign  equal  importance  to 
minimising positive failure and keeping biometrics 
private, since every time the biometrics are exposed, 
the  task  of  minimising  positive  failure  becomes 
more  difficult.  By  drawing  on  the  characteristic 
strengths  of  the  different  factor  types,  we  aim  to 
build a system that is less likely to fail positively by 
means  of  forgery.  The  system  will  still  fail 
negatively should the user forget or lose the physical 
factor; unfortunately this must be the case as only 
biometric  factors  are  guaranteed  to  be  always 
available. The user presents a biometric factor (for 
identification) and a physical factor (for verification) 
during  the  authentication  process.  The  biometric 
factor consists of two components; i.e., the biometric
reader which in implementation could be a standard 
“off the shelf” biometric device and the transformer 
could  be  readily  implemented  in  software  on  the 
client. The physical factor also consists of a security 
token and a small storage device. In implementation 
the small storage device could be a smartcard or a 
modified USB storage key. 
Figure 4: Components of the new system
6 OBFUSCATION OF 
BIOMETRICS
During authentication the server must perform an 
operation of the following form (verification of an 
identity):
    false true t i C , ,  (6.1)
In  current  biometric  systems  the  two  inputs 
(input  and  template)  are  both  elements  from  the 
same  space  and the  function  is essentially a piece 
wise  function  based  on  the  matching  distance 
function   m
(6.2)
In Argles et al, (2007) the biometric system was 
obfuscated by splitting, however the authentication 
functionC remains  the  same  as  (6.2).  The 
disadvantage of requiring  i  and  t to be elements 
from the space is that security of the system depends 
on the ability to perform C  in private. If the privacy 
of  C is  not  guaranteed  the  attacker  could  cause 
positive failure by acquiring either i ort.7 HASH FUNCTIONS
The solution for the username/password systems 
is  to  use  a  hash  function  (or  one-way  function) 
resulting in the following authentication function:
(7.1)
The  properties  of  (7.1)  would  be  ideal  in 
protection of user biometrics as the security of the 
system  will  not  depend  on  the  privacy  of  the 
biometric database. Therefore a biometric data can 
be  hashed  and  stored  on  the  server.  Hashing  may 
seem  an  appropriate  solution  for  biometrics; 
however  the  problem  arises  when  matching  an 
incoming  biometric  against  the  stored  hashed 
template. A  biometric  data  will  produce  a  close 
match  and  not  an  exact  match.  The  inability  to 
match input template with the stored template will 
lead to unacceptably high false rejection rates.
8 SOLUTIONS USING 
HEURISTICS
An approach for producing a biometric digest is 
using elastic matching algorithms in place of hash 
functions.  The  matching  algorithms  are  ideal 
candidates  since  they  are  already  of  the 
form     D j i m , : .  We  can  adapt  the 
matching  algorithm  to  fit  the  form  required  by 
generating an arbitrary biometric input  K and then 
comparing  the  input  with  the  generated  input:
In effect we require an algorithm 
that can identify close matches i.e. elastic matching 
algorithm. We define the authentication function as 
follows:
         
    


 
 

f t d i d false
f t d i d true
t d i d Ci |
|
, (8.1)
Note  that  the  authentication  function’s  range 
does not expose the input biometric or the template 
it is not possible to obtain i  from   . i d
8.1 Enrolment
Figure  6  depicts  the  sequence  diagram  for  the 
enrolment process. 
1. The  reader  acquires  the  user’s  raw 
biometrics (Bu)
2. The authentication server sends a server ID 
that is unique to the system
3. The transformer (T) generates an arbitrary 
template (S) from the server ID
4. The  transformer  then  produces  a 
representation  of  the  raw  biometric  with 
respect to the arbitrary template. I.e. T (S, 
Bu) = O. where, O is the origin and T has 
the  properties  of  an  elastic  matching 
function.
5. The  new  representation  of  the  raw 
biometric is sent to the server for storage
6. The  origin  (generated  template)  is  then 
stored on the physical storage device.
7. User password  is  acquired  and  encrypted. 
The  password  is  stored  on  the  token  and 
sent to the server for storage.
8.2 Authentication
Figure 7  shows the authentication process  as a 
sequence  diagram.  The  Diffe-Hellman  [DifHel76] 
exponent  is  used  to  establish  an  encrypted 
conversation between the client and server.
1. The  client  produces  the  origin  (generated 
template) stored on the token 
2. The  client  gets raw  biometrics (Bu
*)  from 
reader and produces a digest. i.e. T (O, Bu
*) 
= S
*
3. The  client  requests  a  one-time  password 
from the token. The client encapsulates the 
digest  (S
*)  and  one-time  passwords  and 
sends the package to the server
4. The  server  decrypts  the  package  and 
extracts  the  digest  (S
*)  and  one-time 
password.
5. The server queries the digest  database for 
the most likely match
6. The  servers  checks  the  current  password 
against  the  stored  password  for  the  most 
likely match
7. If  the  passwords  match  the  use  is 
successfully  authenticated,  else 
authentication fails.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that the resilience of 
a  multifactor  authentication  system  could  be 
improved by combining the factors to preserve the 
privacy of the user biometric. A novel approach is 
presented in constructing a digest from the biometric 
and physical factors. The digest is used in place of 
the  raw  biometric  in  authentication;  therefore  the raw biometric is never exposed which minimises the
risk of exposure. An elastic matching algorithm was 
used for producing the digest. One of the benefits of 
using the digest is its ability for trivial sorting and 
indexing; thus making the system scalable. Further 
work will be to examine the suitability of different 
matching algorithms for constructing the digest.
Figure 6: Enrolment in the proposed system
Figure 7: Authentication in the proposed system
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